As of the end of May 2026, the likelihood of a new large-scale ground invasion by Russian troops from Belarus remains minimal, estimated by military experts at only 3-5%. According to the Defense Forces, there are currently no signs of active preparations for an offensive on Belarusian territory: there is no movement of heavy equipment, buildup of personnel, formation of ammunition or fuel depots, or deployment of field hospitals.
This is reported by Finway
Use of Belarusian Infrastructure and the Role of the Wagner Group
Despite the lack of preparations for a direct offensive, Belarusian military infrastructure, including three airfields, may be used for actions by Russian troops, particularly to increase the range of strike drones by placing relays along the border. However, as analysts note, the Republic of Belarus actively employs its own air defense systems, and there have already been instances of Belarusian military forces shooting down Russian drones. This indicates that Belarusian airspace is not unrestricted for the Russian Federation.
A particular danger is posed by the presence of about 5,000 personnel from the Wagner Group on Belarusian territory. They are legalized under local legislation and have experience in urban combat. These forces could be used by the Russian side to create local threats along both the Belarusian-Polish and Belarusian-Ukrainian borders, which creates additional hybrid risks.
Defense, State of the Belarusian Army, and Ukraine’s Readiness
According to intelligence, there are no significant strike groups of the Russian Federation on Belarusian territory that could carry out a large-scale invasion. The Kremlin maintains up to 2,500 servicemen in the country, mostly logistical, support, and technical units. About 1,450 personnel are working at the radio-technical nodes in Baranovichi and Vileika, while over 500 military personnel service airfields and air defense, electronic warfare, and aviation systems. This deployment does not indicate the formation of strike forces.
“At the same time, the State Border Guard Service officially denied the accusations of the Belarusian Security Council regarding the alleged ‘massive attacks by Ukrainian drones’ on Belarusian border infrastructure. Ukrainian border guards emphasize that such statements from Minsk are purely an information provocation aimed at shifting responsibility.”
The Ukrainian side has emphasized to Lukashenko that in the event of provocations from Belarus, a response could be delivered across the entire territory of the country, including strategic facilities. This exerts significant deterrent influence on the decisions of the Belarusian leadership regarding participation in possible scenarios from 2022, especially since the Belarusian army is not building up forces for an offensive.
The Belarusian army consists of approximately 55,000 personnel, of which 15,000 are civilians, and the ground forces comprise up to 24,000 military personnel. The most combat-ready are considered to be the 38th Guards Separate Mobile Brigade (Brest), the 103rd Guards Separate Mobile Brigade (Vitebsk), and the 5th Separate Special Purpose Brigade (Maryina Hirka). The annual conscription to the army is about 50,000 individuals, and the trained reserve stands at 290,000.
In the event of hypothetical participation by the Belarusian army in an invasion, it could deploy up to 20,000 trained military personnel. There are over 1,300 T-72B tanks in storage and in operation, which have been modernized. Therefore, the potential threat remains, although it is currently low.
Ongoing tension on the northern border forces Ukraine to maintain significant forces and reserves, allowing the Russian Federation to divert attention from the main directions of combat operations. At the same time, in recent years, the Ukrainian-Belarusian border has been significantly fortified: large-scale engineering and fortification works have been carried out, deep minefields have been created, and operational reserves have been organized to prevent a repeat of the scenario from February 2022.
On the Ukrainian side, the construction of new defensive structures continues, with the mining of the most risky directions, and monitoring is being enhanced using modern aerial reconnaissance means. Experts are convinced that the scenarios of the first months of the full-scale war will not be repeated, and any provocations from Belarus will receive a decisive response from Ukraine.