Vladimir Putin has once again begun to actively use rhetoric regarding nuclear weapons, after the Russian Federation was unable to guarantee complete security for the May 9 parade without suspending Ukrainian attacks. According to experts from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), such statements about the testing of the “Sarmat” missile aim to conceal serious problems with Russia’s rear defense, as well as the failures of the Russian army on the front lines.
This is reported by Finway
The Kremlin Returns to Nuclear Rhetoric Amid Failures
Analysts note that the Russian Federation’s authorities have previously announced the rapid deployment of “Sarmat” missiles — similar promises were made in 2021, 2022, and 2023. However, after what is likely to have been a failed test of this missile in November 2024, the topic virtually disappeared from the public space. Now, following recent failures, it has re-emerged in Putin’s statements.
According to ISW, the new surge in nuclear rhetoric occurred after the celebration of Victory Day. In particular, Russia was forced to significantly reduce the scale of the parade in Moscow due to the risk of Ukrainian strikes on rear areas, including the capital of Russia.
“Deep Ukrainian strikes in the rear revealed Russia’s weakness and inability to reliably protect its deep rear areas, including its capital, from these strikes, and as a result, Russia held a significantly reduced parade. Putin likely intends to use his test launch of the ‘Sarmat’ missile and his rhetoric to conceal the fact that it was Ukraine, not Russia, that guaranteed the security of the Victory Parade in Moscow,” the report states.
Statements About “Sarmat” as a Distraction from Frontline Problems
ISW specialists emphasize that the rhetoric surrounding the “Sarmat” is also aimed at diverting attention from the deteriorating military situation for the Russian army. Despite the Kremlin’s loud statements about an offensive, the pace of the Russian troops’ advance has been steadily declining since the fall of 2025. According to the report, in April 2026, the Russian army lost more territory than it was able to capture for the first time in a long period. Furthermore, in January, the number of recruits in the Russian army fell below the level necessary to compensate for losses for the first time since the start of the full-scale war.
Experts emphasize that Russia’s spring-summer offensive, which began in March 2026, did not bring the expected results for the Kremlin. Instead, Ukrainian forces liberated part of the territories near Kupiansk, reclaimed over 400 square kilometers in southern Ukraine, and conducted successful counterattacks in the western part of the Zaporizhzhia region at the end of April.
As a result, ISW analysts note that the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine force the Russian command to constantly redeploy reserves to various directions, weakening certain sections of defense. This complicates the Kremlin’s ability to maintain the illusion of a large-scale offensive and demonstrate confidence in its own forces.
“Ukrainian forces have forced Russia to choose between defending against Ukrainian counterattacks and allocating human resources and forces to priority sectors of the front line — a choice that perplexes Putin, whose theory of victory depends on the facade that Russian troops are simultaneously advancing across the entire theater of operations and are close to breaking through Ukrainian lines,” ISW writes.